Fayetteville State University

DigitalCommons@Fayetteville State University
Sociology Department Faculty Working Papers

Sociology Department

1983

ETHNIC INEQUALITY IN IRAN: AN OVERVIEW
Akbar Aghajanian
Fayetteville State University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.uncfsu.edu/soci
Part of the Inequality and Stratification Commons

Recommended Citation
Aghajanian, Akbar, "ETHNIC INEQUALITY IN IRAN: AN OVERVIEW" (1983). Sociology Department Faculty
Working Papers. 13.
https://digitalcommons.uncfsu.edu/soci/13

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Sociology Department at
DigitalCommons@Fayetteville State University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Sociology Department Faculty
Working Papers by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Fayetteville State University. For more
information, please contact dballar5@uncfsu.edu.

Int. J. Middle East Stud. 15 (1983), 211-224 Printed in the United States of America

Akbar Aghajanian
ETHNIC INEQUALITY

IN IRAN: AN OVERVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Iran is a country of diverse ethnic and linguistic communities. There are Kurds
in the west and northwest, Baluchis in the east, Turks in the north and
northwest, and Arabs in the south. Persians are situated today in the central
areas. Through the history of Iran these various ethnic groups have lived in
geographically distinct regions and provinces. Along with this residential separation, social and economic distance has long persisted and still continues among
ethnic communities. Yet, regrettably, there is very little known about these
inequalities in the contemporary history of Iran.
A full examination of the historical development of the ethnic and linguistic
communities in Iran is beyond the scope of this paper.' It is clear, however, that
ethnic diversity goes back to pre-Islamic times. Iran has always been predominantly populated by groups of people of distinct linguistic and cultural identities.
Persians, or Parthians (Greeks called them Perse for the province they were
usually found in, viz., Pars, or Fars) generally lived in the Central Plateau.
Kurds have lived in the ranges of the west and northwest (the Zagros Mountains)
since the period of the Medes.2 In the valleys of Central Asia were the Turks, in
the south were the Qufs, and toward the southeast were another Iranian ethnic
group known as the Baluchis. It was in the midst of this complex of peoples that
the Islamic conquest of Iran took place. Although there was never any mass
colonization of Iran by the Arabs, Arab penetration in the southwestern and
southern regions continued where the climate was favorable.
Historically, linguistic and cultural differences and geographic isolation have
operated as forces against the unification of the ethnic communities. However,
historical and cultural consciousness and recent improvement in communication
systems and roads have operated as cohesive base for nationalism.3 Hence, today
there are five major ethnic groups in Iran, each organized around distinct
familial and cultural patterns and having its own religion and language and
Iranian nationality.
There has been some internal migration and movement of people to and from
various ethnic communities, but the majority of the people still live where their
ancestors lived.4 Today, Kurds live in parts of West Azarbayjan (Mahabad
district, cities and villages, and Bukan districts), and in the Kurdestan and
Kermanshah provinces. Almost all the population of East Azarbayjan are Turks
who, along with the population of Zanjan and the Qashqai tribe, form the
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Turkish ethnic community of Iran. Turks also live in West Azarbayjan and in
some cities and villages, such as Naghadeh and Miandoab. They live in mixed
communities with Kurds. The small community of Turkoman live in the Gorgan
plains, primarily in the city of Gonabad-i-Kavus. The Arabs live in Khuzistan
and the southern coastal provinces of the Persian Gulf. Finally, the Baluchis live
in the southeastern province of Baluchistan. Persians live in all the other
provinces. There is not much known about the exact population figures for each
ethnic community. The Iranian censuses in the last two decades have not
considered the question of ethnicity.5
The Kurds, who speak Kurdish, generally belong to the Sunni sect of Islam.
There are, however, a number of Kurds in Kermanshah who adhere to Shi'ism.
The Turkish mother language is Azari or Azarbayjani, which is structurally
similar to Turkish but with a strikingly different dialect.6 The Shi'a sect of Islam
is the dominant religion of the Turks of Iran. Turkomans speak Turkoman and
hold to Sunni beliefs. The Baluchi language is linguistically close to Pashtu, the
language spoken in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Baluchis are Sunni. The Arabs
speak Arabic as their mother language and adhere to Sunni Islam, which further
separates them from other Iranians.
ETHNIC

INEQUALITY:

BACKGROUND

AND

HYPOTHESIS

The basic intention of this paper is to describe the current situation of
inequality among Iranian ethnic communities. The hypothesis to be discussed is
that current inequality among ethnic communities is the by-product of uneven
modernization and political centralization during the Pahlavi period. How the
situation has been in the past and what factors have contributed to inequality
before this period are matters for separate research. Yet from historical records
and descriptions, it seems that ethnic inequality has emerged and further
developed with the integration of Iran into the world economy; transforming the
closed economies of the ethnic communities into components of the national
economy. At the turn of the century and toward the end of the Qajar rule, the
economies of the ethnic communities were locally integrated and, in most cases,
the relation between central government and various local populations was
through taxes collected by governors. In fact, a truly national economy did not
exist; the state functioned only to collect tribute from accessible sedentary
populations to support the royal family and its retainers. The taxes and tributes,
however, were not enough to cover the rising expenses of the Court, especially
the trips of the Qajar kings to Europe. To cover the skyrocketing expenses,
resources in different parts of the country had to be given away to foreign
powers, in particular, Britain and Russia. This was another step in AngloRussian hegemony which by 1907 resulted in the division of the country into
spheres of influence. The British sphere was in the southeast and the Russians
were controlling the resources of the north.7
However, in July 1909, the constitutionalists occupied Tehran and sent
Mohammad Ali Shah into exile in Russia. There followed two-and-a-half years
of parliamentary rule during which the country was faced with many problems
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inherited from the Qajar dynasty. There was no security, and money or taxes
could not be collected.8 The country was in total paralysis by 1921, when a coup
d'etat brought into power Sayyed Zia Tabatabai and Reza Khan.9
Reza Khan, later the first king of the Pahlavi dynasty, started reforms to unify
and revitalize the state, and hence promote secularism and modernization of the
socioeconomic structure of the nation. This was a new stage in the Iranian
capitalist development which involved destruction and transformation of precapitalist formations in the local ethnic communities in order to integrate them
into the developing national economy. Along with the establishment of industries
in the central areas and development of the infrastructure-i.e., significant
improvement in roads and communication-the state financial apparatus and
bureaucracy spread into local ethnic communities. Yet, this was only a surface
integration of the ethnic communities, which actually promoted backwardness
and uneven development and modernization. In the remaining part of this paper,
we describe some aspects of this uneven development and modernization and
explore the process behind it.
MODERNIZATION

AND

ETHNIC

INEQUALITY

Beginning with the work of Robert Park,?1there have been numerous efforts
to develop sociological theories to classify and explain variations in ethnic
inequality over time and space. The well-known race relation cycle of Park (later
developed by Frazier)" was based on a universal sequence of stages of interethnic
relations beginning with contact, leading to competition, followed by a period of
stable accommodation, and an eventual process of assimilation. Other sociologists
-most notably Barth and Noel, Lieberson, and Kwan-have put forth theories,
most generally in the form of typologies.'2 The basic kernel of these theories of
ethnic inequality is that type and organization of the society shape the structure
of ethnic relations. And as societies are transformed in various ways, ethnic
relations are posited to change in certain directions.
Whereas the phenomenon to be explained-be it inter-ethnic inequality,
political or economic dominance, assimilation or the lack of it-varies considerably among these theories, they all address discrimination and unequal distribution of resources among ethnic groups in a society. Specifically, they are
interested in the degree to which one ethnic group as a whole, or a person as a
member of a specific ethnic group, is disadvantaged. Furthermore, as macrostructural components of the society change, how does this disadvantaged
position change? What is the relation between social change and ethnic inequality?
However, in most cases, lack of historical or comparable data deter such
investigations.
In the context of these theories, it is ideal to examine, at the individual and the
aggregate levels, the consequence of the structural changes during the last
decades (i.e., the pre-Islamic Revolution) for ethnic inequality in Iran. While we
lack historical data, we could interpret our one-time data in the context of
growth in the dependent economy during the last decade and its distribution in
the system.

214

Akbar Aghajanian

MEASUREMENT

OF INEQUALITY

In this paper we concentrate on the degree to which one ethnic group as a
whole is disadvantaged in comparison to other ethnic groups, particularly the
Persians. Whereas data gathered at the individual level about ethnic and
socioeconomic characteristics are not available, correlation between place of
residence and ethnicity allows utilization of macrolevel provincial data to
compare ethnic communities for certain socioeconomic characteristics. In fact,
we compare provinces settled by distinct ethnic communities. A basic limitation
of this macrodata analysis is that through selective migration some of the
advantaged individuals from the disadvantaged groups move to an advantaged
group or groups. This results in over-estimation of the disadvantaged position of
some ethnic groups which have out-migration. This problem, however, remains
insoluble until individual-level data are available.
We are not able to use data from Khuzistan province where the majority of
the Arab community live. This is because non-Arabs have mingled with Arabs in
this area to a large extent since 1912.13Particularly, because of the in-migration
of Persians to this area, the provincial data do not reflect the situation of
Arabs.'4 For Turkomans who live in the province of Mazandaran we also lack
comparable data. Given these limitations, our ethnic-province inequality analysis
relates to provincial data analysis for Persians who are mainly living in the
central province, Kurds, Turks, and Baluchis. Although our analysis is based
primarily on the 1970s data, we also utilize 1960s data, where available, to see
how the differences among ethnic communities have declined.
ETHNIC

OCCUPATIONAL

STRUCTURE

AND

URBANIZATION

An individual's occupation and industrial sector delineate his/her socioeconomic position in the social system shared with other people. Hence, occupational attainment has always been an important aspect of the study of ethnic
inequality. The basic question focuses on whether there is any causal relationship
between occupational attainment and ascribed status of ethnicity. At the macrolevel, it is important to see differences in the occupational and/or industrial
distribution among ethnic communities. Specifically, our concern here is if some
ethnic communities are more represented in the disadvantaged sector of the
traditional agriculture. Data presented in Table 1 indicate that this is in fact the
case. In 1976, 36.1 percent of the employed population in Iran were in the
agricultural sector. This figure is 13.8 percent for the Central province, where
Persians live. That is, Persian participation in the agricultural sector is significantly below the average for all ethnic communities. On the other hand, for the
Baluchis the figure is 57.1 percent, 20 percentage points more than the figure for
the nation as a whole and 44 percentage points more than the same figure for
Persians. The rate of participation for Kurds and Turks in the agricultural sector
is high, but below the level for Baluchis.
There is a rational basis for considering differentials in residence as significant
in relation to ethnic inequality. In almost every situation, it is clear that those
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I Occupational structure and urbanization for various provinces
(in percent of population)*
Working in
agriculture

Province and ethnicity
Central (Persian)
East Azarbayjan (Turks)
West-Azarbayjan (Kurds and Turks)
Kermanshahan (Kurds)
Kurdestan (Kurds)
Sistan & Baluchestan (Baluchi)
Iran

Living in
urban areas

1966

1976

1966

1976

19.2
(-27.0)
50.2
(+04.0)
61.0
(+14.8)
55.2
(+09.0)
69.0
(+23.2)
66.6
(+20.0)
46.2

13.8
(-22.3)
41.6
(+05.5)
53.9
(+17.8)
40.7
(+04.6)
51.6
(+15.5)
57.1
(+21.0)
36.1

70.3
(+31.2)
29.0
(-09.8)
25.5
(-13.6)
35.4
(-03.7)
16.5
(-22.6)
14.4
(-24.7)
39.1

79.7
(+32.9)
36.3
(-10.5)
32.1
(-14.7)
43.4
(-03.4)
24.2
(-22.6)
24.5
(-22.3)
46.8

*Scores in parentheses are deviation from the average for Iran.
Source: Iran Statistical Center Reports on the .05 sample of the 1976 Census of Housing and
Population of Iran; reports of the 1966 Census of Housing and Population of Iran.

living in urban areas have greater access to educational institutions, are exposed
to more diverse employment opportunities, and receive higher incomes than
rural residents. These differences directly relate to economic opportunities and
well-being. In 1976, the average level of urbanization for all ethnic communities
in Iran was 46.8 percent (see Table 1). Yet, the four ethnic communities vary
much around this mean figure. The rate for Baluchis and Kurds is less than 25
percent. For Kurds living in Kermanshahan this is slightly below the average for
the nation. On the other extreme, Persians in the Central province have an
urbanization rate of 80 percent.
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

Access to education does not relate only to better jobs and higher economic
status; but it also affects length of life and the health of the individual and the
family. For a country like Iran, where educational attainment to high levels is
not predominant, differentials in literacy level signify the existence of inequality.
Table 2 shows the level of literacy for various provinces and ethnic communities.
Gender and ethnic inequality in education are evident. In fact, the non-Persians
and the women are disadvantaged in general, and the Baluchi and Kurd females
are the most disadvantaged in particular. In 1976, about 47.5 percent of the
population aged six years and above were literate in Iran. This rate is 66.1
percent for the population of the Central province. That is an increase of over 19
percentage points above the average. The rates for other ethnic communities are
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TABLE2

Literacy rate by sex for various provinces and ethnic groups
(in percent)*
Male

Province and ethnicity
Central (Persian)
East Azarbayjan (Turks)
West Azarbayjan (Turks and Kurds)
Kermanshahan (Kurds)
Kurdestan (Kurds)
Sistan & Baluchestan (Baluchi)
lran

Female

Total

1966

1976

1966

1976

1966

1976

59.7
(+19.6)
31.5
(-08.6)
29.2
(-10.9)
34.7
(-05.4)
21.8
(-18.3)
23.1
(-17.0)
40.1

74.8
(+16.0)
51.1
(-08.7)
50.1
(-08.7)
53.6
(-05.2)
43.8
(-15.0)
39.1
(-19.7)
58.8

38.5
(+20.2)
8.9
(-09.0)
9.3
(-08.6)
14.2
(-03.7)
5.7
(-12.2)
6.2
(-11.7)
17.9

56.6
(+21.0)
21.7
(-13.9)
25.2
(-10.4)
29.7
(-05.9)
15.0
(-20.6)
19.4
(-16.2)
35.6

49.6
(+20.2)
20.5
(-08.9)
19.8
(-09.6)
25.1
(-04.3)
14.3
(-15.1)
14.9
(-14.5)
29.4

66.1
(+18.6)
36.3
(-11.2)
38.1
(-09.4)
42.2
(-05.3)
30.0
(-17.5)
29.7
(-17.8)
47.5

*Scores in parentheses are deviation from the average for Iran.
Source: See note to Table 1.

below the average rate for the nation and significantly below the rate for
Persians.
In Kurdestan and Baluchestan less than 20 percent of the eligible females are
literate. In the Central province 56.6 percent of eligible females are literate in
comparison to the figures of 21.7 percent for Turks of East Azarbayjan and 25.2
for Kurds and Turks of West Azarbayjan. For males the figure for the Central
province is 74.8 in comparison to the rate of 39.1 for Baluchestan and 43.8 for
Kurdestan. Males in East Azarbayjan and Kermanshahan are in a much better
situation, with respect to education, than males in Baluchestan and Kurdestan;
yet they are significantly disadvantaged when compared with those in the Central
province.
PUBLIC HEALTH AND AVAILABILITY OF UTILITIES

Two measures of public health and housing utilities are reported in Table 3.
Availability of electricity and piped water relates to all kind of health and wellbeing of the family and hence existence of differentials in the availability of these
facilities suggests inequality among subpopulations.
While for the whole country less than 50 percent of households have had
electricity in 1976, in the Central province 80 percent of families have had this
utility. On the other hand for Baluchis this figure is 12.4 and for Kurds living in
Kurdestan province it is less than 20 percent. For Turks it is below the average
for the nation and much below of the rate of Persians.
The availability of piped water directly relates to the morbidity and mortality
rates in the communities. Almost 75 percent of all Persian families of the Central
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3

Availability of housing utilities for different provinces
(in percent)*

Province and ethnicity

Central (Persians)
East Azarbayjan (Turks)
West Azarbayjan (Turks and Kurds)
Kermanshahan (Kurds)
Kurdestan (Kurds)
Sistan & Baluchestan (Baluchis)
Iran
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Houses with
electricity

Houses with
piped water

1966

1976

1966

1976

55.7
(+30.3)
16.6
(-08.8)
13.0
(-12.4)
17.7
(-07.7)
8.2
(-17.2)
6.5
(-18.9)
25.4

80.7
(+32.5)
36.0
(-12.2)
28.9
(-19.3)
36.2
(-12.0)
19.5
(-28.8)
12.4
(-35.8)
48.2

68.7
(+54.4)
7.4
(-06.9)
7.1
(-07.2)
12.1
(-02.2)
2.5
(-11.3)
3.3
(-11.0)
14.3

74.9
(+33.9)
25.6
(-15.5)
24.3
(-16.7)
33.7
(-07.3)
12.0
(-29.0)
24.5
(-16.5)
41.0

*Scores in parentheses are deviation from the average for Iran.
Source: See note to Table 1.

province have had piped water in their housing units in 1976. This figure is 35
percentage points more than the average for the country as a whole. For
Baluchis it is less than 25 percent of the families and for Kurds it is only 12
percent. The figure for Turks is also about 25 percent. In general, it is evident
that the distribution of the public utilities, like other resources of the nation, is
uneven among the ethnic communities and regions of the country.
POVERTY

Is the distribution of poverty different among ethnic communities? To answer
this question we need a measure of poverty or a quantitative criterion to
differentiate poor families within the communities. In fact, to provide a perfect
picture of poverty there is need for a special survey of poverty and utilization of
a multidimensional index of poverty. Currently, the only available source of data
to study poverty in Iran are the results of household budget surveys. The 1973
reports of this survey include tabulation of the proportion of poor families by
province. In 1973, families with a total consumption expenditure of less than 60
thousands Rials ($857) were considered as poor. Table 4 indicates the proportion
of poor households in the province with various ethnic communities.
In 1973, about 41.3 percent of households in Iran have been classified as poor.
This figure is 21.0 percent for the Central province, where the majority of the
population are Persians, and 77.0 percent for Baluchis. For the Kurds and
Turks, the rates of poverty of families are significantly above the rate for
Persians. When poverty level is examined by rural-urban residence, the results
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TABLE 4

Proportion

of the families at povertiy level of consumption*
(in percent)

Province and ethnicity
Central (Persians)
East Azarbayjan (Turks)
West Azarbayjan (Turks & Kurds)
Kermanshahan (Kurds)
Kurdestan (Kurds)
Sistan & Baluchistan
Iran

Total

Urban

Rural

21.0
32.0
35.0
38.0
30.8
77.0
41.7

12.2
22.0
26.8
10.1
23.9
47.7
25.4

56.8
37.7
38.8
59.3
33.9
83.0
56.2

*Poverty is defined as a total monthly consumption of less than 60 thousand Rials or about $857
($1 = 70 Rials).
Source: Plan organization, Statistical Center Report on the 1973 Rural and Urban Household
Budget Survey.

are slightly different. Urban poverty is highest in Baluchistan and Kurdestan,
and lowest for Persians. Rural poverty, however, is highest for Baluchis, but
Kurds and Turks are in the middle.
THE DISTRIBUTION OF RECENT AFFLUENCE AMONG ETHNIC COMMUNITIES

The basic paradigm of the long-standing macrosociological theory of ethnic
inequality is that of "structural assimilation" or "institutional dispersion." That
is, the secular trend is one of converence across ethnic communities. Most social
scientists subscribe to the fundamental assumption that industrialization and
modernization will gradually reduce and eventually eliminate interethnic inequality. This perspective, formally developed by Park15 (and later, by his students)
suggests that modernization and industrialization will weaken the importance of
ethnic and other ascriptive criteria, and lead to a stratification system with an
emphasis on achieved characteristics. The logic of this hypothesis rests on the
assumption that modern society has certain fundamental needs that can be
satisfied by rational decision-making-and
inequality based on religion, language,
and ethnicity are primordial sentiments of less developed stages, which will
diminish as society develops.
Does the convergence theory apply to the ethnic inequality in Iran? That is,
how do we interpret the existing socioeconomic
inequalities among ethnic
communities in the context of the industrialization and economic growth of Iran
during the decade before the Islamic revolution? To answer this question we first
refer to some of the social and economic indicators and their changes during the
1966-76 period and how these changes (if any), could have affected ethnic
inequality.
In 1976, per capita income in Iran reached $1,857 from a low of below $500 in
1966.16 With a sudden sharp increase in the oil revenues in 1973, the total
national income of Iran multiplied by several fold to $20.6 billion in 1976.
Employment in manufacturing and mining reached 2.4 million by 1975, and the
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number of large industrial units reached 5,432 by 1976. There were 69 television
stations in 1976. This figure was only I in 1966. Similarly, the number of Iranian
universities increased significantly, and by 1976 there were 151,905 university
students studying in Iran.17
These data suggest clues to significant changes in the fabric of the Iranian
society toward modernization and industrialization of the economy. Yet, the
question is how has this affluence been distributed? That is, to what extent has
the substantial growth in the economy led to greater equality among ethnic
communities? To answer this question we have reported the 1966 data where
comparable data for 1976 were available in Tables 1 to 3. Data on poverty were
not available for 1966. The figures in parentheses show the deviation score of
each ethnic community from the average score for the country in a specific year.
These deviation scores help in understanding change in the pattern of distribution.
As seen in Table 1, the pattern of deviation score for participation in
agriculture has not changed significantly by 1976. The gap between East Azarbayjan and the average rate for the country has increased. This is true also for
West Azarbayjan. That is, East and West Azarbayjan have become more
dependent on agriculture relative to the country and the Central province. The
situation of inequality with respect to urbanization has not improved. The subtle
change for East and West Azarbayjan is toward less equality. With respect to
literacy (Table 2); the pattern of inequality among ethnic communities has not
improved. There is only small improvement in the level of male literacy in West
Azarbayjan. On the other hand, with respect to female literacy only the Central
province gains and all other ethnic communities, especially the Baluchis, have
lost by 1976. Similarly, as the country had become more affluent by 1976, the
distribution of utilities had become less equal (Table 3). The pattern of deviation
scores for availability of utilities indicates a more skewed situation. For example,
the deviation score for availability of electricity in East Azarbayjan is -8.8 in
1966. This figure has changed to -12.2 in 1976. This means 12.2 percentage
points below the rate for the country. The situation was worst for Baluchistan.
Hence, comparison of the distribution of various socioeconomic characteristics
in 1966 and 1976 suggests that the gains of the booming economy and tremendous
economic growth have not been distributed fairly among the ethnic communities.
In fact, it seems that the general socioeconomic attainment at the societal level
has widened the socioeconomic gap among ethnic groups rather than decreasing
it.

CAUSES

OF ETHNIC

INEQUALITY

So far most of our attention has focused on measurement of ethnic inequality.
The next obvious point to consider is the observed increasing interethnic
inequality in spite of considerable economic growth and modernization for the
country. The so-called assimilation hypothesis predicts improvement in the
distribution of resources among ethnic communities as the general economic
condition improves. Yet our data run contrary to this expectation. One explanation for this is that the structure of modernization and economic growth has
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adapted to existing interethnic inequality.'8 This hypothesis assumes the existence
of inequalities at the stage before the process of modernization and industrialization starts.
There is, however, no data about socioeconomic inequality among ethnic
communities in the premodernization era. The premodern economy was dependent basically upon agriculture and a small sector of trade and commerce. The
economies of ethnic communities were mostly locally integrated, and due to the
structure of the land-tenure system, economic inequality within the communities
should have been much more than between communities. It appears that
interethnic inequality has developed along with the process of modernization,
and we should look into the particular nature of the Iranian modernization
process for causes of ethnic inequality.
The process of modernization of Iran started with the overthrow of the
decaying Qajar dynasty by Reza Khan, who later assumed the title of the Shah.
His first steps toward modernization were creating a strong army and pushing
for political centralization. In fact, a strong army was needed to bring law and
order to the chaos left by the Qajar king. Hence, Reza Khan fought against and
removed local feudals and leaders. Furthermore, the old administrative division
of the country, which consisted of "lyalats" or states-each a culturally homogeneous unit-was changed to a system of ten provinces, each a political entity
with a number rather than a name.'9 He also deprived the remaining local
leaders from appointment to any official positions in their own locality.20
This was the first step toward political inequality between ethnic communities;
sociocultural boundaries of localities were changed to political boundaries and
local community leaders were deprived of leadership in their own community.
Along with the process of political centralization and as part of the appeal to
nationalism and Iranianism for revitalization of the country, certain cultural
changes were introduced which were biased against non-Persian ethnic communities. Among these were the social and legal priorities of the Persian culture and
language, i.e., Persian language became the only language to be taught at school.
Another important aspect of the modernization attempts was change in the
structure of the economy from agrarian to modern industrial. In fact, early in the
1920s almost 80 percent of the 11.5 million population of Iran lived in rural
areas. In the attempt toward industrialization, Reza Shah himself and the
government took a major role. In addition to early achievements in creation of
an infrastructure, including roads and communication systems, the government
took a significant role in capital formation. By the 1930s, many governmentestablished industries-a huge arms industry, sugar factories, textile and several
small chemical plants-were operating. A positive point about this industrial
achievement was that to finance these industries, Reza Shah did not depend on
foreign loans or resort to oil revenue. The early industrialization of Iran was
financed from revenue generated from the large peasantry, taxes on land, and
custom duties.2 It was later in 1933 that the oil concession of 1901 was
renegotiated and the increased oil revenues were used to put into effect further
industrial plans. Foreign capital investment was mainly British investment in the
oil industry, which was an enclave industry and had no linkage with the other
industries.22
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The negative aspect of this early industrialization was that the industries were
generally located in the Central province and northern areas of the country. For
instance, out of twenty-five textile factories, nine were located in Isfahan and
others were located in Tehran and Mazandaran. Other industries were basically
located in Tehran. Hence, the spread effect of the industrialization was predominantly on the Persian population in the Central Plateau. Other groups in
Kurdestan and Azarbayjan who had paid for it, were deprived of its prosperity.
Hence, the skewed distribution of industries among communities was another
step toward ethnic inequality. A further consequence of this biased situation was
migration from the non-Persian communities to cities in the Central plateau,
especially the capital. Local communities remained agrarian and sent manpower
for industrialization of the central areas.
Another negative aspect of the early Iranian industrialization process (also
predominant in recent years) was too much emphasis on "industry" in the strict
sense of the word rather than including industrialization of agriculture. Hence,
the ignorance of the agricultural sector and agricultural communities widened
the interethnic inequality gap because most of non-Persian communities depended
on agriculture.
The processes of economic modernization and industrialization of Iran accelerated in the 1960s and 70s after a period of political instability. In addition to
continued centralization and domination of Persian language and culture in this
new era of the Iranian modernization, the pattern of economic growth contributed
to the widening socioeconomic inequality among ethnic communities. In short,
along with political centralization, economic growth has been centralized and
biased toward the population of the central plateau. This uneven development
and central bias is the result of: (1) shift in the source of governnent expenditure
from domestically generated revenue to foreign loans and oil revenue, (2) the
domination of "industrialism" in the development programs, and (3) increase in
the foreign investment. In the remaining part of this section, we discuss these
three factors in connection with the centralized economic growth in Iran.
A large share of the government expenditure during the last two decades has
originated from the revenue generated in the oil sector. In fact, oil revenues have
gradually replaced the domestically generated revenue in the agricultural sector.
The total oil revenue of $513 million in 1965 reached to the figure of $18,871
million in 1975. Yet, the most salient aspect of this shift in the source of revenue
was that the new revenue is generated with very little contribution from the
domestic means of production. On the other hand, the government, because of
its unique access to oil revenue and as the agent of expenditure of this revenue,
became the determinant of the socioeconomic position of groups, classes, and
regions. Hence, where the oil revenues were spent and who got the highest share
became a function of relation with the central government. Given this determinative position, the government had no problem creating a pattern of centralized
development expenditure. Hence, the Central province with 20.7 percent of the
total population of the country received 32.7 percent of the development budget
in 1972-73. East Azarbayjan with 10 percent of the population received 4.8
percent of the budget. In 1974, 14.3 percent of the agricultural loans went to the
Central province, while the same figure for Baluchistan was 0.7.
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The 1950s and 1960s tradition of economic development models emphasized
industrialization as the only path to economic development.23 This tradition of
thought dominated the Iranian development planning with ambitious industrial
goals, especially with the sudden jump in the oil revenues.24As industrialism was
equated with development, the agricultural sector, and hence, ethnic communities
with agricultural bases, were ignored. The central government no longer needed
the revenues generated in these areas, rather it was the community that was
dependent on the central government to get a share of the oil money.
Another element in the new era of Iranian modernization and industrialization
was foreign investment. By 1976, about 3,976 foreign firms had investments in
Iran. This figure was 1,563 in 1968.25Most of these investments have been highly
capital-intensive and required high-level technology and management. It is
obvious that the firms choose the already-developed central province as the best
location, for it provides the skilled manpower and the westernized social
environment for foreign personnel. This again has resulted in deprivation of
local communities in favor of the already-developed central province.
SUMMARY

In this paper we discussed socioeconomic inequality among ethnic communities
in Iran. There were significant clues to the widening gap between Persian and
non-Persian communities. That is, contrary to the existing theories, modernization and industrialization have not been accompanied with improvement in the
distribution of the resources among ethnic communities; rather they have
increased inequality. Thus, we looked into the particular nature of Iranian
modernization for causes of interethnic inequality. Political centralization, domination of Persian language and culture, and centralization of early industrialization contributed much to the development of the interethnic inequality at early
stage of the Iranian modernization. In the new area, the 1960s-1970s, the
existing gap was further widened by centralized and urban-biased economic
growth. This was possible only because of the government's unique access to the
increasing oil revenues which were generated with very little help from the
domestic means of production.
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